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Unless our universe is decaying at an astronomical rate (i.e., on the present cosmological timescale
of Gigayears, rather than on the quantum recurrence timescale of googolplexes), it would apparently
produce an inﬁnite number of observers per comoving volume by thermal or vacuum ﬂuctuations
(Boltzmann brains). If the number of ordinary observers per comoving volume is ﬁnite, this scenario
seems to imply zero likelihood for us to be ordinary observers and minuscule likelihoods for our
actual observations. Hence, our observations suggest that this scenario is incorrect and that perhaps our
universe is decaying at an astronomical rate.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.“The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it
is comprehensible”, according to Einstein. This mystery has both a
philosophical level1 and a scientiﬁc level. The scientiﬁc level of the
mystery is the question of how observers within the universe have
ordered observations and comprehensions of the universe.
If observers within the universe were suﬃciently dominated by
those that are thermal or vacuum ﬂuctuations (Boltzmann brains
[1–3] or BBs), rather than by ordinary observers (OOs) that arise
from nonequilibrium processes like Darwinian evolution by natu-
ral selection, then the probability would be very near unity that a
random observer would be such a BB. However, the observations
and thoughts of such observers would be very unlikely to have the
degree of order we experience. Therefore, if our observations can
be interpreted to be those of random observers, our ordered obser-
vations would be statistical evidence against any theory in which
BBs greatly dominate. A theory in which the universe lasts too long
after a ﬁnite period of OOs is in danger of being such a theory that
is statistically inconsistent with observation.
This argument, a cosmic variant of the doomsday argument [4],
uses a version of the Copernican Principle or Vilenkin’s Principle of
Mediocrity (PM) [5], such as Bostrom’s [6] Strong Self-Sampling As-
sumption (SSSA): “One should reason as if one’s present observer-
moment were a random sample from the set of all observer-
moments in its reference class”. This is similar to how I might
today state my Conditional Aesthemic Principle (CAP) [7]: “Unless
one has compelling contrary evidence, one should reason as if
one’s conscious perception were a random sample from the set of
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1 A theistic explanation is that the universe was created by an omniscient God
who comprehends fully and who created humans in His image to comprehend par-
tially.0370-2693 © 2008 Elsevier B.V.
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Open access under CC BY license.all conscious perceptions”. I would argue that the reference class
of all observer-moments (which I would call conscious perceptions,
each being all that one is consciously aware of at once) should be
the universal class of all observer-moments, but for the present
Letter it is suﬃcient to take any reasonable restriction of the refer-
ence class.
For example, consider the reference class of scientists observing
the galaxy–galaxy correlation function (GGCF).2 This would almost
certainly be only a very tiny fraction of all observer-moments for
BBs and presumably a much larger (but still small) fraction of all
observer-moments for OOs. However, if the BBs suﬃciently dom-
inate, most scientists observing the GGCF would be BBs rather
than OOs. Then within this reference class, we could compare the
likelihoods that various theories give the observed GGCF. For BB
theories that predict that almost all observer-moments within this
reference class are BBs, we would expect that almost all of the
“observed” GGCFs would be highly disordered, so the likelihood of
our observed GGCF would be very much smaller than in OO the-
ories in which most observer-moments within the same reference
class are OOs. Therefore, unless we take the prior probability for
BB theories to be extremely near unity, our observed GGCF would
be strong statistical evidence that the posterior probability for BB
theories should be taken to be very small.
In simple terms, our observations of order (e.g., a comprehen-
sible world) statistically rule out BB theories in which observers
formed by thermal or vacuum ﬂuctuations greatly dominate over
ordinary observers.
If we have a theory for a ﬁnite-sized universe that has ordinary
observers for only a ﬁnite period of time (e.g., during the lifetime
of stars and nearby planets where the ordinary observers evolve),
2 I am grateful to James Hartle for this example.
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haps mostly ordered), then the universe would have only a ﬁnite
number of ordinary observers with their largely ordered observa-
tions. On the other hand, if such a theory predicts that the universe
lasts for an inﬁnite amount of time, then one would expect from
vacuum ﬂuctuations an inﬁnite number of observers (almost all
extremely short-lived, with very little ordered memory) and obser-
vations (almost entirely with minuscule order or comprehension).
Such a BB theory would give a much smaller likelihood of our
actual observations than an OO theory (in which BBs do not dom-
inate over OOs) and so would be discredited.
Therefore, a good theory for a ﬁnite-sized universe apparently
should also predict that it have a ﬁnite lifetime. (For example, this
was a property of the k = +1 Friedmann–Robertson–Walker dust
model universes.)
For an inﬁnite universe (inﬁnite spatial volume in one con-
nected region, or an inﬁnite number of connected regions in a
suitable multiverse picture of the universe [8]), which is predicted
to be produced by eternal inﬂation [9–11], the argument is not so
clear. In this case one could get an inﬁnite number of both ordi-
nary observations and disordered observations, and then there may
be different ways of taking the ratio to give the likelihoods of the
possible observations within each reference class [12–20].
For example, one may [13] deﬁne the probability P j for an ob-
servation to be the product P j = p j f j of the probability p j for a
particular pocket universe and of the probability f j of the obser-
vation within that pocket. Here I shall assume that f j is regulated
by taking the ratio of different kinds of observations within a ﬁxed
comoving volume of the pocket universe. This would give the right
answer for any ﬁnite bubble universe, no matter how large, but of
course it is an untested ansatz to apply this procedure to an open
or inﬁnite bubble universe.
With this assumption, the prospect of BB production then leads
one to conclude that any model universe should not last forever if
it has only a ﬁnite time period where ordinary observers dominate
[21], though it must be noted that other regularization schemes
do not lead to this conclusion [13,18,19]. However, here we shall
assume observations within a given pocket universe are regulated
by taking a ﬁnite comoving volume.
The next question is what limits on the lifetime can be deduced
from this argument. In [21] it was implicitly assumed that the uni-
verse lasted for some deﬁnite time t and then ended. Then the
requirement was that the number of vacuum ﬂuctuation observa-
tions per comoving volume during that time not greatly exceed the
number of ordered observations during the ﬁnite time that ordi-
nary observers exist. For any power-law expansion with exponent
of order unity, and using a conservative action of 1050 for a 1 kg
brain to last 0.1 seconds, I predicted [21] that the universe would
not last past t ∼ e1050 years, and for an universe that continues to
grow exponentially with a doubling time of the order of 10 Gyr, I
predicted that the universe would not last past about 1060 years.
If instead one used what I now believe is a more realistic action
of 1042 for a 1 kg brain to be separated by 30 cm from the corre-
sponding antimatter [22–24], then the corresponding times would
be t ∼ e1042 years and 1052 years respectively.
Here I wish to emphasize that the expected lifetime should be
much shorter if the universe is expanding exponentially and just
has a certain decay rate for tunneling into oblivion. Then the de-
cay rate should be suﬃcient to prevent the expectation value of
the surviving 4-volume, per comoving 3-volume, from diverging
and leading to an inﬁnite expectation value of vacuum ﬂuctuation
observations per comoving 3-volume. Since this minimum decay
rate is set by the asymptotic cosmological expansion rate of the
universe, it may be said to be astronomical (huge on the scale of
the quantum recurrence time [25]).Suppose [23] that the decay of the universe proceeds at the
rate, per 4-volume, of A for the nucleation of a small bubble that
then expands at practically the speed of light, destroying every-
thing within the causal future of the bubble nucleation event. Then
if one takes some event p within the background spacetime, the
probability that the spacetime would have survived to that event
is P (p) = e−AV4(p) , where V4(p) is the spacetime 4-volume to
the past of the event p in the background spacetime. Then the
requirement that there not be an inﬁnite expectation value of vac-
uum ﬂuctuation observations within a ﬁnite comoving 3-volume
is the requirement that the 4-volume within the comoving region,
weighted by the survival probability P (p) for each point, be ﬁ-
nite rather than inﬁnite. For an asymptotically de Sitter background
spacetime with cosmological constant Λ, the expectation value of
the 4-volume of the surviving spacetime is ﬁnite if and only if [23]
A > Amin = 94π H
4
Λ =
Λ2
4π
 (20 Gyr)−4 = e−562.5, (1)
using H0 = 72± 8 kms−1 Mpc−1 from the Hubble Space Telescope
key project [26] and ΩΛ = 0.72± 0.04 from the third-year WMAP
results of [27] to get HΛ = H0√ΩΛ .
For a universe that is spatially ﬂat and has its energy den-
sity dominated by the cosmological constant and by nonrelativistic
matter, as ours now seems to be, its k = 0 FRW metric may be
written as
ds2 = T 2[−dτ 2 + (sinh4/3 τ )(dr2 + r2 dΩ2)], (2)
where T = 2/(3HΛ). This gives a survival probability
P (τ ) = exp
[
−16
27
A
Amin
τ∫
0
dx sinh2 x
( τ∫
x
dy
sinh2/3 y
)3]
. (3)
With the present earth population of nearly 7 billion, this would
give a minimal expected death rate of about 7 persons per cen-
tury. (Of course, it could not be 7 persons in one century, but all
7 billion with a probability of about one in a billion per century.)
It also gives an upper limit on the present half-life of our universe
of [23] 19 Gyr.
Although there are no observations that directly rule out the
suggestion here that our universe is decaying at an astronomical
rate (more likely than not to decay within 20 billion years), this
suggestion is surprising and would itself result in various myster-
ies. For example, it would leave it unexplained why the decay rate
A is greater than Amin ≈ (20 Gyr)−4 and yet not so great to make
it highly improbable that our universe has lasted as long as it has.
There might be a factor of 1000 window for the allowed A, but
if, for example, the decay rate is given by Eq. (5.20) of [28], this
translates into only a 0.6% variation in the allowed value of the
gravitino mass [23], which seems unnaturally restrictive. Further-
more, even if the annihilation rate A can be within this range for
our part of the multiverse, it would still leave it unexplained why
it is not less than Amin in some other part of the multiverse that
also allows observers to be produced by vacuum ﬂuctuations. If it
were less in any such part of the multiverse, then it would seem
that part would have an inﬁnite number of vacuum ﬂuctuation ob-
servations that is in danger of swamping the ordered observations
in our part.
Because of these potential problems with the prediction sug-
gested here (that the universe seems likely to decay within 20 bil-
lion years), one might ask how this prediction could be circum-
vented.
One obvious idea is that the current acceleration of the universe
is not due to a cosmological constant that would last forever if the
universe itself did not decay away. Perhaps the current acceleration
is instead caused by the energy density of a scalar ﬁeld that is
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this seems to raise its own issue of ﬁne tuning, since although the
observership selection effect can perhaps explain the small value
of the potential, it does not seem to give any obvious explanation
of why the slope should also be small, unless the scalar ﬁeld is
actually sitting at the bottom of a potential minimum (effectively
a cosmological constant).
Another possibility is that the normalization employed in this
Letter to get a ﬁnite number of ordinary observers, namely to
restrict to a ﬁnite comoving volume, might not be the correct pro-
cedure if our universe really has inﬁnite spatial volume. This is
indeed the conclusion of several authors [13,18,19].
For example, Bousso and Freivogel [18] have recently argued
that the paradox does not arise in the local description [30] (unless
the decay time is much, much longer) and is evidence against the
global description of the multiverse. On the other hand, both Linde
[19] and Vilenkin [13] have more recently given examples of how
one may avoid the dreaded “invasion of Boltzmann brains” within
their global description.
Linde’s solution [19] is analogous to the following situation [23].
Consider imaginary humans who have a ‘youthful’ phase of 100
years of life with frequent and mostly ordered observations, fol-
lowed by a ‘senile’ phase of trillions of years of infrequent and
mostly disordered observations. Assume that the trillions of years
are suﬃcient to give many more total ‘senile’ disordered obser-
vations than ‘youthful’ ordered observations for each human. One
might think that most observations would then be disordered,
so that someone’s having an ordered observation (which would
thus be very unlikely under this scenario) could count as evidence
against the theory giving this scenario. However, if the population
growth rate of such humans is suﬃciently high that at each time
the number of youthful humans and their ordered observations
outnumbers the senile humans and their disordered observations,
Linde’s solution is that at each time the probability is higher that
an observation would be ordered than that it would be disordered.
With the same aim, Vilenkin argues [13] that since BBs are
equilibrium quantum ﬂuctuation processes, they should be lumped
with bubbles in being calculated by the factor p j in P j = p j f j
rather than by the factor f j , which he suggests should be re-
stricted to observations formed by nonequilibrium processes. Then
he notes that when BBs are counted in p j , they are dominated by
bio-friendly bubbles that are also counted in p j , since each such
open bubble gives an inﬁnite universe and an inﬁnite number of
OOs. He concludes, “As a result, freak observers [BBs] get a vanish-
ing relative weight.”
I agree that these solutions are possible ways to regulate the in-
ﬁnity of observations that occur in a universe that expands forever,
but they do not yet seem very natural [20]. The problem arises
from the fact that if the youthful humans or OOs are always at
late times to outnumber the senile humans or BBs, the population
of these ﬁctitious humans, or the volume of the universe in the
original example, must continue growing forever, producing an in-
ﬁnite number of both youthful and senile ﬁctitious humans or of
both OOs and BBs in cosmology. Then it is ambiguous how one
takes the ratio, which is the fundamental problem with trying to
solve the measure problem in theories with eternal inﬂation.
Of course, the fact that we have ordered observations and are
almost certainly not Boltzmann brains is strong evidence against
what I have here proposed as a natural way of using volume
weighting in the global viewpoint (unless the universe has a half-
life less than 20 billion years [23]). So in comparison with the
observations, my proposal of regulating by comoving volume is
deﬁnitely worse than the other prescriptions [13,18,19], unless the
universe really is decaying at an astronomical rate.
So if the prediction suggested in this paper (that our universe
seems likely to decay within 20 billion years) is wrong, it may bepart of our general lack of understanding of the measure in the
multiverse. On the other hand, despite the ﬁne-tuning problems
mentioned above, it is not obvious to me that it really is wrong,
so one might want to take it seriously unless and until some other
really natural way is found to avoid our ordered observations being
swamped by disordered observations from vacuum ﬂuctuations.
One might ask what the observable effects would be of the de-
cay of the universe, if ordinary observers like us could otherwise
survive for times long in comparison with 20 billion years.
First of all, the destruction of the universe would likely occur
by a very thin bubble wall traveling extremely close to the speed
of light, so no one would be able to see it coming to dread the im-
minent destruction. Furthermore, the destruction of all we know
(our nearly ﬂat spacetime, as well as all of its contents of parti-
cles and ﬁelds) would happen so fast that there is not likely to be
nearly enough time for any signals of pain to reach our brains. And
no grieving survivors will be left behind. So in this way it would
be the most humanely possible execution.
Furthermore, in an Everett many-worlds version of quantum
theory (e.g., [7]), the universe will always persist in some frac-
tion of the Everett worlds (better, in some measure), but it is just
that the fraction or measure will decrease asymptotically toward
zero. This means that there is always some positive measure for
observers to survive until any arbitrarily late ﬁxed time, so one
could never absolutely rule out a decaying universe by observa-
tions at any ﬁnite time, though suﬃciently late ordinary observers
would have good statistical grounds for doubting the astronomical
decay rate suggested here.
In any case, the decrease in the measure of the universe that I
am suggesting here takes such a long time that it should not cause
anyone to worry (except to try to ﬁnd a solution to the huge sci-
entiﬁc mystery of the measure for the string landscape or other
multiverse theory). However, it is interesting that the discovery of
the cosmic acceleration [31,32] may not teach us that the universe
will certainly last much longer than the possible ﬁnite lifetimes of
k = +1 matter-dominated FRW models previously considered, but
it may instead have the implication that our universe is actually
decaying astronomically faster than what was previously consid-
ered.
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